Military History Tours Australia On Tour - Our Other Anzac Day 24 April 2008
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After breakfast, the coaches departed for the first of three days touring The Somme Battlefields. Today we drove through the City of Albert and visited Bullecourt, Delville Wood and Beaumont Hamel. There was also visits to Maissemy German and One Tree Hill Cemeteries. Each coach was accompanied by an expert guide. Extracts of the guides' briefing for each battlefield can be found by following the links. The evening was quiet, as the next day was to be big.
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German Operation ‘Albericht’ – withdrawal to the Siegfried Stellung (Siegfried Line- as in the song ‘We’ll hang out our washing on the Siegfried Line”) or Hindenberg Line. Complex defence lines consisting of deep dug outs and concrete emplacements (block houses and pillboxes) protected by deep barbed wire. This channelled the attacker into pre – determined killing zones which could be swept by artillery and machine gun fire.
Two main lines: OG (Old German) 1and OG2. Germans made extensive use of reverse slope positions and machine guns firing in enfilade and from the front along the belts of wire.
The Allied forces follow up of the Germans to the Hindenberg Line (known as the “Outpost Villages “battles) and the Canadian Corps successful attack on the line at Vimy Ridge to the north. The Australians, leading out of Bapaume, followed the Germans through the villages of Vaulx – Vraucourt, Morchies, Baumetz, Lagnicourt, Moeuvres, Noreuil, Doignies, Louverval, Boursies and Hermies.
General Gough was warned in the planning stage (which commenced on April 5) by BRIG GEN Brudenell White COS 1 Anzac Corps that it would take eight days to cut the wire and he didn’t have sufficient artillery or time to do it.
General Gough wanted to break into the Hindenberg Line and was convinced by a junior officer of the Tank Corps (MAJ Watson) that the belts of wire could be broken down and flattened by the new wonder weapon – the tank – without the need for an artillery bombardment. This would then allow the infantry to penetrate the German defences.
General Gough was a British cavalry officer and eager to make his mark as a successful commander as quickly as possible. The planning for this attack was rushed and not thought through in detail. He decided on the use of tanks for the attack the next day!!
12 tanks from No.11 Coy, ‘D’ Bn, Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps (security pseudonym for what was to become the Tank Corps) were tasked to lead the attack in front of the Australians and 62 (UK) Div.
First Bullecourt 10 – 12 Apr 1917
Rushed and incomplete planning
Tanks didn’t arrive. Poor practical appreciation of their use and speed. Held up by snow and poor visibility.
Wire not cut – Discovered and reported by Capt Albert Jacka VC MC Intelligence Officer of 14 Bn. He found the Sunken Road near the railway embankment and captured a small German patrol. He went back and warned his commanders of the need for artillery fire to cut the wire.
Freezing cold conditions, snowing, attacking lines of soldiers lying out in the snow near the Sunken Road waiting for the tanks.
Attack eventually postponed until same time next day. Soldiers exhausted and had to move back to their lines under fire. “they straggled back like a crowd leaving a football match” – BRIG Elliott, Comd 15 Bde. “Exhausted and dragging rifles along the ground by the sling. Of what use would I be to fight tonight” – Pte Galwey – 47 Bn. Germans now knew that they were going to be assaulted. 4 (Aus) Div did not inform their neighbours - 62 (UK) Div - that attack was postponed. They attacked Bullecourt village with an exposed right flank and suffered severe casualties.
Second assault on the 11th Apr – tanks again late and became targets as daylight approached. Murray and Jacka realised that the tanks wouldn’t reach the wire before German MG and arty fire caused casualties among the infantry. Despite pleas up to the Army Comd they were told to attack and also that arty support was denied.
First tanks to arrive fired on the 46 Bn by mistake.
Australians breached the OG1 (cutting through the wire by hand!) and were heading for OG2 when the Australian arty came down on them.
Casualties were being caused by the German MG fire from the front and flanks, notably Bullecourt village. Sparks could be seen by the assaulting diggers as the bullets hit the barbed wire strands.
Germans used field guns firing over open sights at point blank range and also ‘K’ or Kern armour piercing bullets to destroy the tanks.
By the afternoon of the 12th, Australian troops had to withdraw back to their own lines because of lack of artillery support.
3300 casualties including 1170 captured as POWs.
German Counter Attack at Lagnicourt 15 Apr 1917
While the Australians were recovering, Germans launched a counter attack against 1 (Aus) Div with 38 Div, 2nd Guards Reserve Div and 4th Ersatz Div.
Assault from the direction of Riencourt and Queant reached the 1st and 2nd AFA (Australian Field Artillery) Bdes’ gun lines around Lagnicourt.
2 AFA abandoned four batteries of guns after removing the breech blocks and dial sights.
5 Bde launched counter attack which drove the Germans out.
1 AFA lost 5 guns (just about a battery!) to damage in the action.
Australians got a fright.
CAPT Newland, LT Pope and SGT Whittle were awarded VCs in this action.
Second Bullecourt 3 – 17 May 1917
Up the same re-entrant !!! Using the Central Road as an axis.
2 (Aus) Div with its 6 Bde on the left (nearest to us) crossing the ground to our immediate front and 5 Bde on the right on the other side of the Central Road. 62nd (UK) Div was still having a go at Bullecourt village!
Break in achieved but could not be exploited.
Tanks again a failure
Fierce bombing (grenade) battles took place in the OG1 / 2 trench lines. Germans also used flame throwers. Both sides used mortars.
2 Div Pioneers dig a 1 km communication trench (Pioneer Trench) parallel with the Central Road to assist reserves and supplies coming forward.
Arty barrage + 96 brigaded MGs from 2 (Aus) Div supported attack.
Failure on the right flank where 5 Bde’s assault was stopped and driven back by MG fire from Queant which was grazing fire over the intermediate crest line (101) feature. Queant not neutralised as part of Comd 5 Bde (Smith’s) fire planning. Severe casualties in 17 and 19 Bns.
1 (AUS) Div brought in to relieve 2 (Aus) Div on 5 May. 1 Bde attacking on the left of the Central Road (nearest to us) and 3 Bde attacking on the right of the Central Road.
On 10 May – 5 days later – both 1 & 2 Divs exhausted and 5 Div was brought into the battle. It had just been rebuilt from its losses at Fromelles the previous year.
Break in achieved with assault forces turning left and right and barricading the German communication trenches. 58 and 60 Bns tasked to turn left and fight their way along OG1 & 2 in the direction of Bullecourt village to support the British attack on the village itself.
Determined counterattacks by the Germans.
Both sides fought to a standstill where they were.
Results of the Battles
3300 casualties including 1170 POWs in First Bullecourt. 4 (AUS) Div out of action for months. Another 7000 casualties in Second Bullecourt (almost half a division) weakened 1, 2 and 5 (AUS) Divs. Total over 10,000 casualties.
Temporary break-in of the Hindenberg Line achieved but destroyed by vigorous German counterattacks (7 major and 10 minor attacks) and the Allied inability to support the forward troops by arty fire. Inability to move guns forward of the Noreuil valley to break through and support further moves on Riencourt / Hendecourt.
Australians would not trust using tanks again for almost a year until Le Hamel in 1918.
Lack of communications other than runners – a hazardous job!, pigeons and rockets (SOS arty)
Poor fire support planning (particularly arty). Movement of guns forward to assist infantry going further and neutralisation of MGs
Plan hinged on an untried weapon – the tanks
Poor staff work at all levels.
GEN Gough described the battles as “being of great assistance” to the main offensives at Arras. The “great assistance” cost 10,000 Australian casualties.
These battles used by the British staff college after the war as examples of how NOT to plan an attack.
Crown Prince Rupprecht said on the 5th of May “according to unanimous descriptions from the front, the English troops show themselves far less tough to repulse than formerly, with the exception of the Canadians and the Australians, who are, on all sides, praised for their bravery and skill in making use of ground”
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Following a successful British dawn attack of 14 July the newly won British line formed a 'salient' the right side of which was threatened by Delville Wood and the northern edge by the uncaptured portions of Longueval village bordering the west side of the wood. Before any eastward attacks towards the German second position at Ginchy, 2 km east from Longueval, could be made it was vital that the whole of Longueval and Delville Wood were captured.
Delville Wood (the bois d'Elville, nicknamed by the troops 'Devil's Wood'), the northern part of which lay on a reverse slope, consisted of 'a thick tangle of trees, chiefly oak and birch, with dense hazel thickets intersected by grassy rides, covering about 156 acres' (Official History, France & Belgium 1916, Volume II). Nearly half a mile square in area, the wood witnessed terrible fighting in the most desperate conditions. The tremendous bombardments meant that by the beginning of August the wood was a vast tangle of burnt and shattered trees, with stumps uprooted and twisted. Those trees remaining were stripped of all foliage. Continuous shellfire repeatedly changed the landscape; there were no permanent landmarks and guides, relieving troops and ration parties would often get lost. Shellfire and rain turned the ground to mud and filled the scraped ditches and shell holes which served as trenches with water. The intensity of the fighting meant that the dead could not be buried. Fighting was at close quarters with bomb and bayonet; the wood was also a hive for deadly snipers.
On Saturday 15 July 1916, as the fighting for Longueval continued, the 1st South African Infantry Brigade was tasked with securing Delville Wood. At that time the South African Brigade, was attached to the 9th (Scottish) Division, and Delville Wood was to be its first battle.
Attacking with great determination at 6.15am they rapidly cleared the southern sector, despite the difficulties posed by tangled undergrowth, fallen trees and shell craters; a second advance took them almost to the wood's north-west edge, where they dug in.
The Germans retaliated with ceaseless shelling, machine gun fire, and a succession of aggressive counter-attacks. Fighting continued by night and day as renewed South African assaults wore themselves out against German defences. On 18 July heavy rain and German counter-attacks forced critical withdrawals but it was not until the evening of 20 July, after six days of continuous fighting, that the South African Brigade was relieved.
It went into action 3,153 men strong and in bitter fighting, captured most of the wood between 14 and 20 July, but when relieved it emerged with only 778 men fit to answer roll call.
Vicious fighting for the wood continued for another six weeks, the advantage continuously changing from one side to the other. Five other divisions - the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 14th (Light) and 17th (Northern) - all fought in Longueval and Delville Wood in July 1916, but the South Africans deserve the credit for the main capture of it.27 July saw the 2nd Division renew the assault, followed on 4 August by the 17th Division; bloody encounters in mid-August pushed the line forward and an attack by the 14th (Light) Division on 29 August forced out all but a remnant of defiant German defenders. The wood was only completely cleared of Germans following the fall of Ginchy on 9 September 1916.
The wood was then held until the end of April 1918 when it was lost during the German advance, but was retaken by the 38th (Welsh) Division on the following 28 August.
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Preceding Events
Russian Revolution released 70 German Divisions to the Western Front.
German Spring Offensive (Operation Michael) launched on 21 Mar 1918.
23 Mar 19 18 – Australian 3rd and 4th Div ordered to Amiens from the Messines sector: strengthen the retreating British 5th Army & check the German advance
Villers-Bretonneux. 4-5 April 1918 concerted German attack by 15 Divisions on a 35 km front. 36 Bn AIF counter attack at first light 5 Apr halted German advance. Australians defending V-B withdrawn by 21 April 1918. Germans captured Villers-Bretonneux on 24 Apr using 3 Inf Div with tank support (the first time the Germans had used tanks). Australian 4th Div hurried into the fight to counter attack that night – pincer movement with 15 Bde north and 13 Bde south of the town and 14 Bde in Reserve. Australian and British troops cleared the village on 25 April 1918.
Monash took command of the Australian Corps on 31 May 1918.
May-June the Australians undertook raids – “Peaceful Penetration”.
Aims
Drive a wedge between the British and French armies
Capture Amiens
Result
Achieved an advance of 65 km in 2 weeks.
The Plan
21 Jun 1918 – Monash proposed a meticulous plan to capture Le Hamel:
Capture key German observation posts east of the village – ‘Wolfsberg’
Straighten the line and reduce frontage on German salient north of Villers-Bretonneux.
This was to be the first attack by Australians not part of a British formation
Monash planned for close cooperation between Arms and Services
Tanks – to overcome the distrust from Bullecourt Infantry/Tank training took place in secret behind the lines. The 60 new Mk V and 4 carrier tanks were kept hidden from the Germans and were to use their speed to catch up with the Infantry at the German trenches.
Artillery – emphasised secrecy/deception: ranging fire covered by fire from alternate positions; 4am daily ‘mixed’ gas/HE barrage with no gas on day of attack (Germans in gas masks when attacked); used to cover every phase of attack – 200 guns for counter-battery, 400 guns in overlapping barrage.
Aeroplanes – aerial photo montage of battle area to help infantry understand the ground; mask the sound of tank movement over the front; bombers attack German guns out of Arty range and road/rail junctions to stop reinforcements; reconnaissance aircraft dropped freshly marked maps of the front at HQ during battle; supply drops to forward troops.
The Troops
US Troops (10 Coy from 131 and 132 Regt) had been assigned for assimilation training with the Australians prior to being committed. 4 Jul selected for attack to coincide with American Independence Day. US Commander, General Pershing, ordered that no US troops were to fight under command of other countries on 2 Jul. Protests from US commanders led to 4 Coy being allowed to participate.
The attack began at first light – 03:10 – on 4 Jul 1918 with what had become a regular barrage, this time without gas though many Germans expected it and were hampered by gas masks.
15th Bde – diversion to the north of the Somme River and Canal (inordinate casualties)
11th Bde responsible to clear Le Hamel village and the ‘Wolfsberg’
43rd Bn – capture and clear the village
44th Bn – split in two halves and bypass to the north and south of the village
42nd Bn – capture the ‘Wolfsberg’ and exploit to the east
4th Bde responsible to clear Vaire and Hamel Woods
15th Bn – capture “Pear’ trench (Dalziel VC), a strongly defended reverse slope post, without assigned tanks which arrived late. Pass to north of woods and turn south to link with the 13th Bn.
16th Bn – capture ‘Kidney’ trench, Vaire and Hamel Woods. Axford VC.
13th Bn - pass to south of woods and turn north to link with the 15th Bn.
Tanks were directed by infantry soldiers and used to take out strong points, demoralising the German defenders
Casualties
Australian – 1400; US – 176
German – 2000+; 1600 prisoners; 2 Field Guns; 179 MG; 32 Trench Mortars; a previously unknown .530 AT Gun now at AWM
The plan for the attack called for all objectives to be secured in 90 minutes. It actually took 93 minutes. The Battle of Le Hamel became the model for almost all of the following battles leading to the German surrender.
On 12 August 1918 Monash was knighted KCB on the battlefield by King George V, the first time a British monarch had honoured a commander in such a way in 200 years.
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Unless otherwise noted battle and battlefield descriptions are prepared jointly by the Military History Tours Historians, as are the photographs.
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